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Abstract
In Bayesian statistics the precise point-null hypothesis θ = θ0 can be tested
by checking whether θ0 is contained in a credible set. This permits testing of
θ = θ0 without having to put prior probabilities on the hypotheses. While
such inversions of credible sets have a long history in Bayesian inference,
they have been criticised for lacking decision-theoretic justification.
We argue that these tests have many advantages over the standard
Bayesian tests that use point-mass probabilities on the null hypothesis. We
present a decision-theoretic justification for the inversion of central credible
intervals, and in a special case HPD sets, by studying a three-decision prob-
lem with directional conclusions. Interpreting the loss function used in the
justification, we discuss when test based on credible sets are applicable.
We then give some justifications for using credible sets when testing
composite hypotheses, showing that tests based on credible sets coincide
with standard tests in this setting.
Keywords: Bayesian inference; credible set; confidence interval; decision
theory; directional conclusion; hypothesis testing; three-decision problem.
1 Introduction
The first step of the standard solution to Bayesian testing of the point-null (or
sharp, or precise) hypothesis θ ∈ Θ0 = {θ0} is to assign a prior probability to the
hypothesis. This is necessary if one wishes to use e.g. tests based on Bayes factors,
as an absolutely continuous prior for θ would yield P(θ ∈ Θ0|x) = 0 regardless of
the data x. We shall refer to this procedure, described in detail e.g. by Robert
(2007, Section 5.2.4), as the standard test or the standard solution in the following.
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A continuous prior can however be utilized in a simpler alternative strategy, in
which the evidence against Θ0 is evaluated indirectly by using inverted credible
sets for testing. In this procedure a credible set Θc, such that P(θ ∈ Θc|x) ≥ 1−α,
is computed and the null hypothesis is rejected if θ0 /∈ Θc. Using credible sets for
testing avoids the additional complication of imposing explicit probabilities on the
hypotheses, avoids Lindley’s paradox and allows for the use of non-informative
priors.
While it has been argued that tests of point-null hypotheses are unnatural from
a Bayesian point of view, they are undeniably of considerable practical interest
(Berger & Delampady, 1987; Ghosh et al., 2006, Section 2.7.2; Robert, 2007,
Section 5.2.4). Inverting credible sets is arguably the simplest way to test such
hypotheses. For this reason, inverting credible sets as a means to test hypotheses
has long been, and continues to be, a part of Bayesian statistics. Tests of this type
have been studied by Box & Tiao (1965), Hsu (1982), Kim (1991), Drummond &
Rambaut (2007) and Kruschke (2011), among many others. Zellner (1971, Section
10.2) credited this procedure to Lindley (1965, Section 5.6), who in turn credited
it to Jeffreys (1961). Lindley suggested that it may be useful when the prior
information is vague or diffuse, with the caveat that the distribution of θ must be
resonably smooth around θ0 for the inversion to be sensible. Koch (2007, Section
3.4) motivated this procedure by its resemblance to frequentist methods. Ghosh et
al. (2006, Section 2.7) described the inversion of credible sets as “a very informal
way of testing”. Zellner remarked that “no decision theoretic justification appears
available for this procedure”.
The purpose of this short note is to discuss such justifications and to put
inverted credible sets on a decision-theoretic footing, making them formal Bayesian
tests. These justifications shed light on when tests based on credible sets should
be used. Throughout the text we assume that the parameter space Θ ⊆ R and
that the posterior distribution of θ is proper and absolutely continuous.
We will study three types of credible sets. A highest posterior density (HPD)
set contains all θ for which the posterior density is greater than some kα. Its
appeal lies in the fact that among all 1 − α credible sets, the HPD set has the
shortest length.
With qα(θ|x) denoting the posterior quantile function of θ, such that P(θ <
qα(θ|x)) = α, the interval (qα/2(θ|x), q1−α/2(θ|x)) is called a 1− α central interval
(also known as an equal-tailed, symmetric or probability centred interval). Central
intervals are often used due to the fact that they are computationally simpler than
HPD sets, especially when the HPD set is not connected. They are also more in
line with frequentist practice.
A credible set is a credible bound (or a one-sided credible interval) if it is of
the form {θ : θ ≤ q1−α(θ|x)} or {θ : θ ≥ qα(θ|x)}. Such sets are of interest when a
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lower or upper bound for the unknown parameter θ is desired.
First, we consider tests of the point-null hypothesis Θ0 = {θ0}. We begin
by comparing test based on credible sets compared to the standard solution with
point-mass priors in Section 2.1, arguing that the former have many advantages.
We then review a decision-theoretic justification of inverted HPD sets proposed
by Madruga et al. (2001) in Section 2.2. This justification involves a loss function
that is non-standard in that it depends on the sample x. In Section 2.3 we propose
a justification of inverted central intervals by recasting the problem of testing Θ0
in a three-decision setting. This allows us to use a weighted 0–1 loss to justify
tests based on central intervals, avoiding losses that depend on x. In Section 2.4
we argue that test using central intervals are preferable to tests using HPD sets.
We then turn our attention to tests of composite hypotheses in Section 3 and show
that inverting credible sets lead to standard tests in this setting.
2 Testing point-null hypotheses
2.1 Contrasting the standard solution and credible sets
Consider tests of the point-null hypothesis Θ0 = {θ0} against Θ1 = {θ : θ 6= θ0}.
We will discuss two problems associated with the standard solution to point-null
hypothesis testing; the use of mixture priors and its poor frequentist properties;
that are overcome by using inverted credible sets instead. We then discuss the
main drawback of tests based on credible sets, namely the lack of direct measures
of evidence. In the below, pi0 > 0 denotes the prior probability of Θ0 in the
standard solution, with pi1 = 1− pi0 being the prior probability of Θ1.
1. The use of mixture priors in the standard test. One could argue, as Berger
& Sellke (1987, Section 2), that when using the standard solution it is in general
reasonable to have pi0 ≥ 1/2 so that Θ0 is not rejected because of its low prior
probability. This is common in practice. It is however much more sensible to
adjust the loss function if stronger evidence is required before Θ0 is rejected. The
prior distribution should reflect the prior beliefs (or lack of them) and not the
severity of rejecting Θ0. Choosing a large pi0 corresponds to using a prior with a
sharp spike close to θ0. Such priors are only reasonable if there is a very strong
prior belief in the null hypothesis, and cannot be used in an analysis where at least
some degree of objectivity is desired.
When lacking prior information or striving for complete objectivity, it is com-
mon practice to use a prior that in some sense is non-informative or objective. The
point-null hypothesis is often a simplification of the hypothesis that |θ − θ0| < 
for some small , in which case pi0 = P(|θ − θ0| < ). If P(|θ − θ0| < ) is com-
puted under an objective prior on θ, pi0 will invariably be extremely small. The
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“objective” prior pi0 = 1/2 is in fact heavily biased towards Θ0.
Berger & Sellke (1987, Section 2) claim that a point-null test only makes sense
to a Bayesian if the prior actually has a sharp spike near θ0. But it is perfectly
reasonable to formulate a hypothesis before constructing an informative prior or
to require that an objective prior is used when no prior information is available.
It is furthermore reasonable to require that the prior distribution can be used for
more than one type of statistical decision, e.g. both estimation and hypothesis
testing; the prior should reflect prior beliefs and not the type of decision that one
is interested in.
2. The poor frequentist performance of the standard test. There are many
situations in which it is reasonable to require that a statistical procedure works well
from both a Bayesian and a frequentist perspective, particularly when an objective
analysis is desirable. A well-known complication with the standard solution to
testing point-null hypotheses is the asymptotic discrepancy between Bayesian and
frequentist analysis that is known as Lindley’s paradox (Lindley, 1957), in which,
for any fixed prior, P(θ ∈ Θ0|x) goes to 1 as the sample size increases for values of
a test statistic that correspond to a fixed (small) p-value. Thus a frequentist and a
Bayesian will reach different conclusions as more and more data is collected. This
is another example of how the standard Bayesian test favours the null hypothesis.
There is no such discrepancy for tests based on credible sets. On the contrary,
when based on non-informative priors, credible sets tend to have favourable prop-
erties when treated as frequentist confidence intervals; see e.g. Brown et al. (2001);
and hypothesis testing using a credible set is often a valid frequentist procedure.
3. Measures of evidence. The main argument against the use of credible sets
for testing is that they do not utilize P(θ ∈ Θ0|x), and so does not really measure
the amount of evidence for and against Θ0. Alas, the first part of this argument
seems weak, considering the contradictions and paradoxes that the standard tests
utilizing P(θ ∈ Θ0|x) give rise to. It should also be noted that a test can be fully
Bayesian without being based on P(θ ∈ Θ0|x) as long at it depends only on the
posterior distribution. Tests based on inverted credible sets have this property.
While credible sets do not measure the evidence against Θ0 directly, there are
indirect measures associated with such tests. With T (x) being the largest HPD
set not containing θ0, Pereira & Stern (1999) proposed P(θ /∈ T (x)|x), i.e. the
smallest α for which θ0 is not contained in the 1 − α HPD set, as a measure of
evidence against Θ0, with values close to 0 indicating that Θ0 is false. Similar
in spirit to the frequentist p-value, this is a measure of how far out in the tails
of the posterior distribution θ0 is. With S(x) being the largest central interval
not containing θ0, one can similarly use P(θ /∈ S(x)|x) as a measure of evidence.
When T (x) and S(x) are viewed as frequentist confidence intervals, these measures
of evidence coincide with the p-values of the corresponding two-sided tests. This
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stands in sharp contrast to the evidence measure P(θ ∈ Θ0|x) utilized in the
standard solution, which is irreconcilable with p-values (Berger & Sellke, 1987).
2.2 The Madruga–Esteves–Wechsler loss and HPD sets
Pereira & Stern (1999) proposed, along with the p-value-like measure of evidence
mentioned above, a test of Θ0 = {θ0} that is equivalent to inverting HPD sets,
dubbing it the Full Bayesian Significance Test. See also Madruga et al. (2003)
and Pereira et al. (2008). None of the aforementioned papers discuss the historical
background of this test, briefly outlined in Section 1 of the present paper.
Let pi(·) denote the a priori density function of θ and define T (x) = {θ :
pi(θ|x) > pi(θ0|x)}. T (x) is the most credible HPD set not containing θ0. The
Pereira–Stern test rejects Θ0 when P(θ /∈ T (x)|x) is ”small” (< 0.05, say). In
other words, Θ0 is rejected at the 5 % level if and only if it is not contained in the
95 % HPD set.
Madruga, Esteves and Wechsler (2001) provided a decision-theoretic justifi-
cation for the Pereira-Stern test, that is non-standard in that the loss function
depends on x. Let the test function ϕ be 0 if Θ0 is accepted and 1 if Θ0 is rejected.
The Madruga-Esteves-Wechsler loss is:
LMEW (θ, ϕ, x) =
{
a(1− I(θ ∈ T (x)), if ϕ(x) = 1
b+ cI(θ ∈ T (x)), if ϕ(x) = 0,
with a, b, c > 0. Minimization of the expected posterior loss leads to the Pereira–
Stern test, where Θ0 is rejected if P(θ /∈ T (x)|x) < (b+ c)/(a+ c). As an example,
the test resulting from the choice a = 0.975 and b = c = 0.025 is equivalent to
inverting the 95 % HPD set.
The controversial part of this decision-theoretic justification of inverting HPD
sets is that the loss function depends on x. While such loss functions have ap-
peared in the literature a few times; Madruga et al. (2001) give Kadane (1992)
and Bernardo & Smith (1994, Section 6.1.4) as examples; they do not appear to
be widely accepted. Indeed, choosing the loss function after x has been observed
is arguably not entirely in line with classic decision theory. Pereira et al. (2008)
argue that an advantage with this type of loss is that it allows the statistician to
include his or her embarrassment over accepting Θ0 when θ0 is not in a particular
HPD set. Such loss functions seems applicable in highly subjective analyses, but
should be avoided when objectivity is desirable. As we will show next, tests based
on central intervals can, in contrast, be justified using a standard loss functions.
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2.3 Central intervals
When testing Θ0, credible (and confidence) intervals are in practice often used for
directional conclusions. If θ0 is above (or below) the credible interval, it is common
practice to reject Θ0 and to conclude that θ is larger (or smaller) than θ0.
Next, we provide a decision-theoretic justification of the inversion of central
intervals that uses a standard loss function not involving x, and for which the
directional conclusions are fully valid. A justification for the use of HPD sets is
obtained in a special case as a corollary.
We formally reformulate the problem of testing the point-null hypothesis Θ0 =
{θ0} as a three-decision problem with directional conclusions. Θ0 is then tested
against both Θ−1 = {θ : θ < θ0} and Θ1 = {θ : θ > θ0}. Such problems have
previously been studied by for instance Jones & Tukey (2000) and Jonsson (2012)
in the frequentist setting and Bansal & Sheng (2010) and Bansal et al. (2012) in
the Bayesian setting.
Theorem 1. Let Θ0 = {θ0}, Θ−1 = {θ : θ < θ0} and Θ1 = {θ : θ > θ0}. Let
ϕ be a decision function that takes values in {−1, 0, 1}, such that we accept Θi if
ϕ(x) = i. Under an absolutely continuous prior for θ and the loss function
L(1)(θ, ϕ) =

0, if θ ∈ Θi and ϕ = i, i ∈ {−1, 0, 1},
α/2, if θ /∈ Θ0 and ϕ = 0,
1, if θ ∈ Θi ∪Θ0 and ϕ = −i, i ∈ {−1, 1},
with 0 < α < 1, the Bayes test is to reject Θ0 if θ0 is not contained in the central
1− α credible set.
Proof. The expected posterior loss is
E(L(1)(θ, ϕ)|x) = E
(
P(θ ∈ Θ1|x)I{−1}(ϕ) + P(θ ∈ Θ−1|x)I{1}(ϕ)
+ α/2 · P(θ /∈ Θ0|x)I{0}(ϕ)
∣∣∣x)
= E
(
P(θ ∈ Θ1|x)I{−1}(ϕ) + P(θ ∈ Θ−1|x)I{1}(ϕ) + α/2 · I{0}(ϕ)|x
)
,
since P(θ /∈ Θ0|x) = 1 because of the absolute continuity of θ. The posterior
expected losses are therefore E(L(1)(θ, 0)|x) = α/2 and E(L(1)(θ, i|)x) = P(θ ∈
Θi|x) for i ∈ {−1, 1}. It follows that the Bayes decision rule is to accept Θ0 if α/2 <
mini∈{−1,1} P(θ ∈ Θi|x), or, equivalently, if 1−α/2 > maxi∈{−1,1} P(θ ∈ Θi|x). But
P(θ ∈ Θ−1|x) > 1− α/2 if and only if the upper bound q1−α/2(θ|x) < θ0, in which
case θ0 is not contained in the central interval. Similarly, P(θ ∈ Θ1|x) > 1 − α/2
if and only if the lower bound qα/2(θ|x) > θ0. Thus Θ0 is accepted if and only if θ
is contained in the 1− α central interval.
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It is not uncommon that the posterior density is unimodal and symmetric,
typical cases of this being normal and Student’s t posteriors. In this case, the
central interval coincides with the HPD set. The following corollary is therefore
immediate.
Corollary 1. If pi(θ|x) is absolutely continuous, symmetric and unimodal, the
Bayes test under L(1) is to reject Θ0 if θ0 is not contained in the 1− α HPD set.
Typically α ≤ 0.1 in L(1), in which case the evidence for either Θ−1 or Θ1 has
to be quite large before Θ0 is rejected. This is a conservative type of analysis,
where the statistician is somewhat reluctant to reject Θ0. Examples of situations
where such a loss is applicable include many investigations of hypotheses in science,
circumstances where falsely rejecting Θ0 leads to considerable economical losses
and legal and forensic questions (this loss is in line with the classic in dubio pro
reo principle).
The posterior probability of the null hypothesis is not evaluated in this test (it
is always 0), but the probabilities of the two alternative hypotheses are. By the
process of elimination, Θ0 is accepted if neither Θ−1 nor Θ1 has a high enough
posterior probability. Θ0 is rejected if θ0 is far out in the tails of the posterior
distribution, making these tests quite similar to frequentist hypothesis testing.
2.4 Reasons to use central intervals rather than HPD sets
for testing
For historical reasons, test based on HPD sets are much more common in the
literature than tests using central intervals; confer the references given in Section
1 for examples. However, from a decision-theoretic perspective, the somewhat
tautological use of the HPD set T (x) in the loss function LMEW seems artifical
in comparison to the easy-to-interpret loss function L(1). The LMEW–justification
of tests using HPD sets involves a good deal more subjectivity than does the
justification of tests using central intervals. In most situations, the latter test seems
to be preferable when a test with a decision-theoretic justification is desirable.
A further argument for prefering inverted central intervals is given by studying
how the two types of tests rejects the null hypothesis. For θ ∈ R, when Θ0 = {θ0}
is rejected, there is always an implicit directional aspect to this decision: the
null hypothesis is rejected because it seems more likely that θ belongs to either
Θ−1 = {θ : θ < θ0} or Θ1 = {θ : θ > θ0}. When the posterior is skewed, HPD sets
are, by construction, biased towards one of these sub-alternatives. Such directional
rejection biases can be avoided by using inverted central intervals for testing.
When the frequentist properties of test based on HPD and central intervals
are evaluated in some common point-null testing problems for scale or rate pa-
rameters, it is seen that this rejection bias causes the HPD set test to have worse
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Figure 1: Power of two-sided tests of the hypothesis H0 : σ
2 = 1, where σ2 is the
variance of the normal distribution with known mean, based on 95 % credible sets
using the Jeffreys prior.
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Figure 2: Power of two-sided tests of the hypothesis H0 : λ = 1, where λ is the
rate parameter of the exponential distribution, based on 95 % credible sets using
the Jeffreys prior.
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power properties than the central interval test. For inference about the scale/rate
parameters in the normal, gamma, inverse gamma and Weibull distributions using
the corresponding Jeffreys priors, the two tests have comparable power for θ < θ0,
while the test using the central interval has higher power for θ > θ0; sometimes
substantially so. Examples are given in Figures 1 and 2; the power functions for
the other cases are similar. In general, the central interval test also seems to come
closer to attaining the nominal size in this setting.
A similar issue occurs when the posterior density is monotone, as is for instance
the case when using the conjugate Pareto prior for θ in U(0, θ). In this setting the
HPD set is an upper or lower confidence bound, meaning that it only is possible
to reject Θ0 in one direction, so that the resulting test in fact is one-sided.
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3 Testing composite hypotheses
When performing tests of composite hypotheses, there is typically no discrepancy
between tests based on credible set and the standard Bayesian tests. This will be
illustrated with two examples below. For Θ0 and Θ1 being uncountable subsets of
R, both with positive probabilities under an absolutely continuous prior, we will
consider the weighted 0–1 loss function
L(2)(θ, ϕ) =

0, if ϕ = 1− IΘ0(θ)
a, if θ ∈ Θ0 and ϕ = 1
b, if θ ∈ Θ1 and ϕ = 0.
First, we consider one-sided composite hypotheses. The proof of the following
theorem is in analogue with that of Theorem 1 and is therefore omitted.
Theorem 2. For the hypotheses Θ0 = {θ : θ ≤ θ0} and Θ1 = {θ : θ > θ0}, with
P(Θ0),P(Θ1) > 0, let ϕ be a test function, such that Θ0 is rejected if ϕ = 1 and
accepted if ϕ = 0. Under an absolutely continuous prior for θ and the loss function
L(2) with a = 1 − α and b = α, 0 < α < 1, the Bayes test is to reject Θ0 if and
only if θ0 is not contained in the lower-bound credible set {θ : θ ≥ qα(θ|x)}, or,
equivalently, if and only if P(θ ∈ Θ0|x) ≤ α.
This is a standard one-sided test and the credible set test is thus in agreement
with the standard methods. The corresponding justification for upper-bound cred-
ible sets is given by considering testing the hypothesis Θ0 = {θ : θ ≥ θ0} against
Θ1 = {θ : θ < θ0} instead.
For a general composite hypothesis θ ∈ Θ0 with the alternative θ ∈ Θ1 = Θ\Θ0,
a correspondence between hypothesis testing and credible test can be established
using a loss function where falsely accepting the null hypothesis is considered to
be much worse than falsely rejecting it. Such a loss can be of considerable use in
situations where false acceptance of the null hypothesis can be costly, for instance
when screening for diseases, malicious web pages or signs of terrorist activity.
Theorem 3. For the hypotheses Θ0 and Θ1 = Θ\Θ0, with P(Θ0),P(Θ1) > 0, let
ϕ be a test function, such that Θ0 is rejected if ϕ = 1 and accepted if ϕ = 0.
Under an absolutely continuous prior for θ and the loss function L(2) with a = α
and b = 1 − α, 0 < α < 1/2, the Bayes test is to reject Θ0 if and only if there
exists at least one α credible set that does not contain a non-null subset of Θ0, or,
equivalently, if and only if P(θ ∈ Θ0|x) ≤ 1− α.
Proof. By Proposition 5.2.2 of Robert (2007), the Bayes test is to accept Θ0 if
P(θ ∈ Θ0|x) ≥ 1 − α. Now, a credible set Θc is a set such that P(Θc|x) ≥ 1 − α.
Thus, by definition, if Θ0 is such that P(Θ0|x) ≥ 1 − α, Θc can be a credible set
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only if P(Θ0 ∩Θc|x) > 0. Hence, we accept the null hypothesis if and only if each
1− α credible set contains a non-null subset of Θ0.
Once again, this is a standard test, albeit a less commonly used one. Using
this loss function corresponds to the statistician being either unsure about which
credible set to report or unwilling to accept Θ0 if there exists at least one way to
look at the data that puts Θ0 to question.
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